Polymarket bot GitHub & npm risks

Shared security byline · 2026-07-08 · Security

In 2026, “Polymarket trading bot” on GitHub is not a free edge — it is often a wallet-drainer with a polished README. Security researchers have documented hijacked orgs, typosquat npm packages, and postinstall prompts that harvest private keys.

This page is part of the Polymarket trading bots handbook.

What the attacks look like

Working cover — the bot may call real Polymarket APIs so demos “work”
Hidden exfil — private keys from .env, postinstall prompts, or “encrypted vault” lies
Social proof — stars, forks, or a hijacked org name that used to be legitimate
npm lookalikes — packages named like Polymarket CLIs that POST keys to attacker Workers

Operator checklist (before you run anything)

Never put a funded wallet key in a bot .env — use a burner with dust only
Prefer non-custodial tools you can revoke — see bot diligence
Read package.json / requirements — unknown postinstall scripts are a red flag
Confirm path — a Global-only bot is not a US product; US vs International
Paper first — paper mode & risk

If you already ran a sketchy bot

Assume the key is burned — move funds from a clean device
Revoke API credentials that lived on that machine
Check SSH authorized_keys and unexpected open ports
Do not “just delete node_modules” and reuse the same key

How this maps to Bot for Polymarket

We will not ask you to paste a wallet private key into a Telegram bot or a random GitHub clone. Bot for Polymarket is waitlist-first with paper mode and risk limits. Join the waitlist if that is the product shape you want.

Also read: copy-trading honesty · diligence questions.

Trust & Diligence Desk · Updated 2026-07-08